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ABSTRACT
Anti-forensics, whether intentionally to disrupt investigations or simply an effort to make a com-
puter system run better, is becoming of increasing concern to digital investigators. This work
attempts to assess the problem of anti-forensics techniques commonly deployed in South Korea.
Based on identified challenges, a method of signature-based anti-forensic trace detection is proposed
for triage purposes that will assist investigators in quickly making decisions about the suspect digi-
tal devices before conducting a full investigation. Finally, a prototype anti-forensic trace detection
system is given to demonstrate the practicality of the proposed method.
Keywords: Anti-Forensics Detection; Digital Forensic Triage; Trace Signature Detection; Pre-
liminary Digital Forensic Analysis; Advanced Preview; Anti-Anti-Forensics; File System Analysis;
Windows Registry Analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
With the growing number, type and complexity
of digital devices, the amount of data needing
analyzed for digital evidence is constantly grow-
ing (Casey, Ferraro, & Nguyen, 2009; Gogolin,
2010). With it, there is a growing con-
cern about the use of anti-forensic techniques
that attempt to hinder digital investigations
(Wundram, Freiling, & Moch, 2013). While
there are various motives for anti-forensics
(Harris, 2006; Garfinkel, 2007), generally anti-
forensic techniques are used to obstruct the ac-
quisition, analysis or validation of digital evi-
dence. For example, there have been a number
of cases where disk encryption either prevented
further investigation, or proved to be a diffi-
cult obstacle to acquiring evidence (Casey, Fel-
lows, Geiger, & Stellatos, 2011; Conrad, Dorn,
& Craiger, 2010).
Rogers (Rogers, 2005) defined four categories
of anti-forensics; data hiding, artifact wiping,
trail obfuscation and attacks against computer
forensics. When any of these types of anti-
forensic techniques are used, investigators face
at least two challenges. The first is simply de-
tecting that some form of anti-forensic tech-
nique has been used on a system under investi-
gation. The next is the attempted reconstruc-
tion of data or information that was affected by
the use of the anti-forensic technique. This work
is primarily concerned with the detection of the
use of an anti-forensic technique in order to give
an investigator more information prior to con-
ducting a full digital forensic investigation. If an
investigator can more effectively check whether
anti-forensic techniques have been used on a
suspect system, such information could poten-
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tially influence the strategies used during a full
investigation.
Providing more information to an investiga-
tor before a full investigation is similar to the
objective of triage (Koopmans & James, 2013)
or advanced preview (Shaw & Browne, 2013)
investigation models discussed in prior works.
A number of tools have implemented different
anti-forensic detection mechanisms, usually fo-
cusing on one category of anti-forensics, which
can take too long to be suitable for triage pur-
poses, eg. in the case of file entropy testing to
detect encrypted containers. This work instead
attempts to apply anti-forensic detection that
is fast enough to be suitable for digital foren-
sic triage purposes, where triage provides intel-
ligence for decision making about exhibits, not
exhibit exclusion.
This work extends the that of Geiger (Geiger,
2005) who analyzed a number of ‘counter-
forensic’ tools related to artifact wiping. He
identified a number of “failure areas” where ar-
tifact wiping tools failed to completely remove
relevant data. Further, such artifact wiping
tools also were found to lead to information dis-
closure about that tool’s usage. Based on these
findings, a detection utility was later created
that “searches for signatures of tested counter-
forensic tools” (Geiger, 2006). This utility uses
Regular Expressions to “match patterns in the
name fields of deleted MFT records and from as-
sociated data sectors”. Unfortunately, the sig-
natures that are created and used by the utility
are not specifically defined, and the utility it-
self does not appear to be available, or may be
available to Law Enforcement only. Other chal-
lenges with this approach include a focus only
on artifact wiping tools, where other categories
of anti-forensics are neglected; a focus only on
NTFS file systems; and an apparent manual cre-
ation of signatures using AccessData’s Forensic
Tool Kit (FTK).
Similar to the work of Geiger, we apply prior
automated event reconstruction techniques that
utilize signatures based on file system and Win-
dows Registry traces. For example, the work
of Khan, Chatwin et al. (Khan, Chatwin,
& Young, 2007) attempted to learn applica-
tion ‘footprints’ using Bayesian networks based
on file system meta-data. A non-probabilistic
model was later proposed by James, Glady-
shev et al. (James, Gladyshev, & Zhu, 2011)
that used real-time system analysis to create
signatures of user actions based on created ob-
servable traces. Similar methods implementing
snapshot-based signature derivation have also
been proposed for automatic event reconstruc-
tion purposes (Kang, Lee, & Lee, 2013; Kalber,
Dewald, & Freiling, 2013). Event reconstruc-
tion, however, focuses more on the reconstruc-
tion of events in time, where this work is con-
cerned only with the detection of traces that
may indicate anti-forensic techniques were used
on a suspect system.
1.1 Contribution
This work contributes to the field of digital
forensic investigation first by assessing the state
of anti-forensics techniques encountered in prac-
tice by Law Enforcement in South Korea. Based
on identified practical needs of investigators, a
modified, more robust, real-time signature cre-
ation algorithm that allows for the understand-
ing of differences in user actions relating to a
specific program is proposed, followed by a novel
application of the proposed signature-detection
method. Instead of applying signature-based
detection to problems of automatic event recon-
struction, this work utilizes fast trace detection
using derived signatures to assist with digital
forensic triage tasks. Finally, this work demon-
strates a prototype trace detection system that
allows an investigator to quickly triage suspect
devices based on traces of anti-forensic activi-
ties. The prototype uses a signature structure
that can be applied to any file system, and is
released as a free, open-source project for use
by all.
2. MOTIVATION
While several prior works have examined the
problem of anti-forensics from the perspective of
classification and detection (Rogers, 2005; Har-
ris, 2006; Garfinkel, 2007; Rekhis & Boudriga,
2010; Wundram et al., 2013), informal discus-
sion with investigators in various countries re-
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veal that some forms of anti-forensics, such as
advanced data hiding, are not as often encoun-
tered in what they consider ‘normal’ cases. In-
stead, it appears to be more common for investi-
gators to encounter attempts at artifact wiping.
To identify the state of anti-forensics, and
the challenges it poses to practical digital foren-
sic investigations in South Korea, a survey was
distributed to Korean public and private sec-
tor digital forensic investigators. In total, 11
responses were received1.
Five investigators claimed to have 3 or more
years experience, while six investigators claimed
to have less than 3 years experience. 82% (9 out
of 11) of respondents claimed to have encoun-
tered some form of anti-forensics during their
time as a digital forensic investigator. 55% (6
out of 11) of respondents claimed to use some
form of anti-forensic detection tool. 100% (11
out of 11) respondents believe there is a need
for more-advanced anti-forensic detection tools.
Likewise, 100% of investigators listed ease of use
as the main desired criteria for an anti-forensic
detection tool. Investigators primarily claimed
that detection should focus on whether anti-
forensic tools exist(ed) on the suspect system,
and to what extent they had been used, e.g. in-
stallation only, portable, running, uninstalled,
etc.
Based on the survey results, there is a need
for an easy to use anti-forensic detection tool to
help an investigator quickly determine to what
extent anti-forensic techniques may have been
used on a system under investigation.
3. ANTI-FORENSIC
SIGNATURE CREATION
AND DETECTION
A signature is defined as a list of traces created
in a system that are associated with a particu-
lar anti-forensic tool or technique. For example,
when running an anti-forensic tool in a Win-
dows system, a number of data sources, such as
file content or meta-data and Registry entries
1Survey questions and results can be found
at http://www.cybercrimetech.com/2013/12/bob-
indicators-of-anti-forensics.html
may be updated. A signature is the collection
of these updates, where each update constitutes
one ‘trace’.
3.1 Signature Creation
Prior works focus on the detection of specific
trace update patterns derive signatures either
by using snapshot analysis (Kang et al., 2013;
Kalber et al., 2013) comparing the updates to
data sources between to different snapshots of
the same system, or using real-time trace up-
date detection (James et al., 2011).
This work proposes an advancement to the
real-time trace update detection. Using real-
time trace update detection, it is possible for
some specific actions to be differentiated, for
example ‘install’ and ‘run’ actions, and corre-
sponded to their specific trace update patterns.
Similar to prior works, trace updates are de-
tected from the file system and Windows Reg-
istry, if available.
In this work, signatures of anti-forensics were
created using the following method:
1. Create test system (Virtual Machine)
2. Run file system logger (Process Monitor)
3. Execute desired action
• Install
• Run/Execute Anti-Forensic Tech-
nique
• Uninstall
4. Save file system logger output
5. Filter log to reduce noise
6. Extract usable unique signature
7. Define traces in resulting signature as reg-
ular expressions for portability
This method differs from (James et al., 2011)
in two ways. First, specific actions – such as
install, run and uninstall – are targets for sig-
nature creation rather than grouping all actions
into one overall signature. This means that if
unique signatures for each type of action can be
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derived then identification in the use of an anti-
forensic tool may be possible. Next, filtering
is more aggressive. Because reconstruction of
events in time is not necessary, only the traces
that are unique to the action are necessary.
3.1.1 Create Test System
In this work, signature creation was imple-
mented using a virtual machine running a 64bit
version of Windows 7. Process Monitor (proc-
mon) was installed on the system for real-time
file system and Windows Registry update mon-
itoring. A snapshot of the ‘clean’ system was
then created for easy system rollback after test-
ing. Such an environment could potentially be
used to create signatures relating to any oper-
ating system.
At this stage, the monitoring program was
used to create a baseline system activity log.
Monitoring was enabled on the system for 5
minutes with no user activities running. The
result is a log of system activities that can be
considered as noise. This log was labeled as
‘falselog.xml’ and will be used to filter results
from application-specific logs.
3.1.2 Monitor, execute and save
Once a test system has been created, the ac-
tion to test must be determined. In this case,
the focus is on anti-forensic programs. Sig-
natures were created for the actions install,
run/execute, and uninstall. If the program was
‘portable’ or does not need to be installed, then
install and uninstall was skipped (Figure 1).
For each selected program, the file system
(and Registry) monitor was started, and each
action relating to the specific program was exe-
cuted. After each action was executed, the mon-
itor was stopped, the log was exported, and the
log buffer was cleared. Monitoring would be
started again, and the next action in the se-
quence would be executed.
After all actions in the sequence were exe-
cuted, and logs were collected, the virtual ma-
chine was revered back to the original snapshot.
This process was completed five times per iden-
tified application. The resulting logs were a col-
lection of XML files with the name of the an-
Figure 1. The action log collection process exe-
cuted five times per anti-forensics application
Figure 2. Action logs for specific anti-forensic
programs combined to filter non-consistently
updated traces per action type
alyzed anti-forensics tool, and the action that
was recorded.
3.1.3 Filter log to reduce noise
The result of the prior step is five logs per
action per anti-forensic program. Since this
work is concerned with reliable traces of anti-
forensic activities, filtering is used to extract
only commonly-created traces. A filtering pro-
gram was created to count the number times a
particular trace was updated for a given action
(Figure 2. An excerpt of the results are shown
in table 1. Traces that were not updated at least
once per action log were discarded. Further, any
traces that exist in both the action log, and the
previously-created ‘falselog.xml’ are considered
as background noise, and were removed from
the action log.
Once system and other background ‘noise’
have been removed, the resulting list of traces
are compared to the ‘clean’ test system. Any
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Process Operation Path Total Hit Log0 Hit file1 Hit Log2 Hit Log3 Hit Log4 Hit
Explorer.EXE ReadFile C:\Program
Files\Eraser\Eraser.exe
25 5 5 5 5 5
Explorer.EXE RegOpenKey HKCU\Software\Classes\Applications\Eraser.exe22 4 4 4 4 6
Explorer.EXE RegOpenKey HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
NT\CurrentVersion\Image
File Execution Op-
tions\Eraser.exe
5 1 1 1 1 1
Explorer.EXE RegOpenKey HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App
Paths\Eraser.exe
5 1 1 1 1 1
Explorer.EXE RegOpenKey HKCR\*\shellex\ContextMenuHandlers\Eraser5 1 1 1 1 1
Table 1. A selection of filtered traces relating
to the action ‘run’ for the anti-forensic program
‘Eraser’
traces that are detected on the clean test sys-
tem are considered false positives, and are re-
moved. The resulting list are traces that are
specific to the action conducted with the ap-
plication. However, they may not be unique
to the action. Each trace may be updated by
either another action relating to the same ap-
plication, or may potentially overlap with other
currently-unknown applications. In prior works
of event reconstruction, unknown applications
are a problem. However, with digital foren-
sic triage this is a non-issue since any overlap
would, at worst, cause a false positive that an
investigator would need to manually verify dur-
ing their full investigation.
3.1.4 Extract usable unique signature
Once the list of traces have been filtered for
noise and false positives, traces specific to the
action should be determined. This is done in
two ways. First, for each action relating to a
specific anti-forensic tool, the resulting logs can
be compared. Any traces that exist in both logs
may be removed.
Another option is to execute many actions in
the test system that are not related to the ac-
tion in question. After the execution of other
non-related actions, if any traces in the signa-
ture match, these should also be considered false
positives.
The result of this process should be a short
list of traces that are specific to the action to
be tested. Once this short list is created for all
actions relating to the particular anti-forensics
tool, then the process of installation, execution
and uninstallation should be executed on the
test system, and each resulting signature should
be tested after each action. If traces in a sig-
Figure 3. Traces of actions detected after each
action was executed, where L1 refers to instal-
lation, L2 refers to execution, L3 refers to unin-
stallation, where circle means a trace of the ac-
tion was detected and X means no trace of the
action was detected
Action Trace
Install C:\Users\user\AppData
\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache \MetaData
\CE4CFAB51DB3F9AB265C1526D1E6F12F
FC8C5CB969BCDC8ACE4FEF989663C7A4
Run HKCU\Software\Eraser\Eraser 6\9977d7c4-c940-4b73-
a02a-33c9ee2d47fe
Uninstall C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft
\CryptnetUrlCache\Content
\CE4CFAB51DB3F9AB265C1526D1E6F12F
FC8C5CB969BCDC8ACE4FEF989663C7A4
Table 2. A selection of unique traces for each
identified action relating to the anti-forensic
program ‘Eraser’
nature match before their associated action has
occurred, these traces should be removed.
One example of signature testing is shown in
figure 3. Here it is shown that before any actions
associated with the anti-forensic tool are exe-
cuted, none of the resulting signatures match.
After installation, only the installation signa-
ture (L1) matches; after the anti-forensic tool is
executed both the installation (L1) and execu-
tion (L2) signatures match. After uninstall, all
three action signatures match, and this match
is persistent after reboot.
Using this method, the traces specific all ac-
tions that are persistent even after a reboot
can be identified. A selection of unique traces
for each action associated with the anti-forensic
program ‘Eraser’ is given in table 2.
3.1.5 Define traces in resulting
signature as regular expressions
for portability
As discussed in prior work (James et al., 2011;
Kang et al., 2013) some form of generalization
of traces within signatures needs to take place to
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allow for detection on other systems. This work
uses regular expressions to generalize variables
in signatures. Implementation, as shown, uses
the path and file name, or Registry key. Regu-
lar expressions are used for fields that are likely
to change depending on system settings, while
keeping the path name as specific as possible
to ensure only the identified trace is returned
by the regular expression. This will enable the
same signatures to be used on similar systems,
however, it should be noted that signatures are
likely to be different depending on the operat-
ing system, and perhaps even the version of the
anti-forensic program.
4. SIGNATURE MATCHING
To illustrate the practicality of trace detection
using pre-defined action signatures for digital
forensic triage purposes, a prototype signature
matching tool was created. The program de-
tects what are defined as ‘Indicators of Anti-
Forensics’ (IOAF) to help a digital investigator
make decisions about suspect systems in regards
to anti-forensic activity. The IOAF tool is avail-
able under a free, open source license2.
The IOAF detection prototype currently ac-
cepts a forensic disk image as an input, along
with a set of signatures (Regular Expressions)
to be detected (Figure 4). The MFT parsing
module uses ‘fls’ in the Sleuth Kit to parse the
input disk image, and outputs the file system in-
formation to a SQLite database. The Sleuthkit
(icat) is also used to extract Registry hives from
an input disk image. Keys and their associ-
ated values are also saved to a separate SQLite
database. Signatures are stored as regular ex-
pressions in a separate signature database.
After parsing the file system and Registry (if
available) with the Sleuth Kit, the signature
parsing and matching module compares traces
in the signature database with traces stored in
the file system and Registry databases. The suc-
cess or failure of a defined trace matching one
(or more - in the case of deleted files) is output
to a report file. A successful match (traces of
2The source for IOAF is available at
https://github.com/CheonChangGeun/IOAF
Figure 4. Design of the Indicators of Anti-
Forensics prototype signature-matching pro-
gram
Figure 5. The Indicators of Anti-Forensics pro-
totype resulting report when no traces defined
in the signature database are found in the sus-
pect system
anti-forensic activities) is shown in green, while
a non-matching pattern is shown in red (no in-
dication of anti-forensics). Example output re-
ports for the anti-forensic tool ‘Eraser’, and the
actions ‘install’ and ’run’ are shown in figures
5 6 7. Figure 5 shows derived signatures tested
against a system where the actions relating to
the anti-forensic tool have not been run. In this
case, no indicators of anti-forensics are found.
Figure 6 shows the same signature tested after
the action ‘install’ has been run on the suspect
system. In this case only the install action has
associated indicators that are detected. Finally,
figure 7 shows the same signature tested after
running both the install and execute actions,
where both actions resulted in detectable indi-
cators.
4.1 Weaknesses
There are a number of weaknesses with the
proposed method. One that is common to all
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Figure 6. The Indicators of Anti-Forensics pro-
totype resulting report when one action defined
in the signature database is found in the suspect
system (green), and indicators of other actions
are not found (red)
Figure 7. The Indicators of Anti-Forensics pro-
totype resulting report when all traces defined
in the signature database are found in the sus-
pect system
signature-based detection methods is that if a
signature does not exist for each specific anti-
forensic technique, then the technique cannot
be detected. Some prior knowledge about the
anti-forensic technique is required to be able to
derive a related signature. Once a signature is
derived, however, it is can be easily shared be-
tween investigators. More global collaboration
between investigators – to create and share sig-
natures of found anti-forensic techniques – could
potentially reduce this weakness.
Similarly, as anti-forensic techniques or spe-
cific tools are developed over time, the resulting
associated traces will also change. While there
normally appears to be a core group of relatively
generic traces (James et al., 2011), signatures
for anti-forensic techniques and programs will
need to be maintained over time.
The proposed method, in an attempt to be a
fast triage tool, currently only utilizes file meta-
data and the current Windows Registry. More
data sources, such as Windows Restore Points
and log files, should be included in the analy-
sis. This is partially a weakness with the pro-
posed method for creating signatures. The cur-
rent method examines what files are affected by
anti-forensic actions, but is not suitable for de-
termining exactly what changes were made to
the contents of the files, except in the case of
the Windows Registry.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Digital investigators, at least within South Ko-
rea, are encountering the use of anti-forensic
tools and techniques. Although it is difficult
to determine the extent of the problem, investi-
gators do see a need for better detection when
such techniques are used on systems under in-
vestigation. This work has proposed a method
for generally identifying whether anti-forensic
tools exist, and – in some cases – to what extent
those tools have been used. By focusing on anti-
forensic trace detection rather than full event
reconstruction, such a method can be imple-
mented as a type of digital investigation triage
tool that quickly gives an investigator more in-
formation about suspect systems that have yet
to receive a full analysis. This can help inves-
tigators prioritize devices, as well as ensuring
investigators are better informed about the po-
tential state of a suspect device.
This work has demonstrated the ‘Indicators
of Anti-Forensics’ detection tool. The results
of the tool are dependent on the quality of the
signatures that are created, whether unique sig-
natures for each ‘action’ exist, and whether a
signature for an anti-forensic tool or technique
can be created at all. Some techniques, for ex-
ample, may leave no discernible traces on a sys-
tem. While the absence of information could be
an indicator of anti-forensic activities, if changes
to the system are consistent with the normal
running of the system, then a signature of the
action can be difficult or impossible to create.
Similarly, overly general trace definitions may
result in multiple traces being detected that are
false positives. While false positives are pre-
ferred over false negatives in digital investiga-
tions, ensuring the quality of signatures can help
to reduce these challenges.
Future work will first look at improving the
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user experience of the IOAF detection tool for
faster trace detection and better processing and
reporting within a digital forensic triage work-
flow. Aside from technical aspects, future work
will include a better understanding of the needs
of Law Enforcement outside of South Korea in
terms of anti-forensics detection.
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